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This article outlines and assesses the main theories of the placebo effect and suggests how they might sit
together in a larger model of placebo etiology. Among the approaches considered are expectancy theory,
emotional change theory, classical conditioning, and the biological approach. Although these are
sometimes assumed to be competing models, in many cases they shed light on different parts of the
placebo puzzle. Expectancies are the core of most placebo effects in human beings. The effects of
expectancies are sometimes unmediated but in other cases are mediated by changes in emotional state,
immune system function, perception, or behavior. Although expectancies are implicated in most placebo
effects, a small number of placebo effects may be solely attributable to nonconscious contingency
learning.
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Physicians have long noted a peculiar phenomenon now widely
known as the placebo effect. In the archetypal instance, a patient is
prescribed an agent, unaware that it is merely a placebo (the classic
example is a sugar pill), and despite the pharmacological irrele-
vance of this agent to the patient’s condition, the patient then
makes a genuine recovery. More generally, a placebo effect is any
genuine psychological or physiological response to an inert or
irrelevant substance or procedure. Interest in this phenomenon is
not confined to medical practitioners. For the philosopher, it raises
issues concerning the relationship of mind and body; for the
skeptic, it provides a naturalistic explanation for the apparent
efficacy of faith healings and so-called alternative medicines; and
for the health psychologist, it showcases many of the psycholog-
ical and behavioral variables that are the subject matter of this
field.
Placebo effects have traditionally been attributed to the recipi-
ent’s belief in the efficacy of a substance or procedure. There are,
however, various other approaches to the problem.1 Unfortunately,
the number and plausibility of these approaches creates confusion
for anyone wishing to think clearly about the mechanisms under-
lying the effect. This confusion is heightened by the fact that there
is empirical support for each, which indicates that it is not a simple
matter of choosing the correct approach and discarding the incor-
rect ones. Some theoretical integration and conceptual reorganiza-
tion is required. This is the goal of the present article. Whenever
possible, an inclusive approach is taken, guided by the assumption
that the various theoretical approaches to the placebo effect each
shed some light on the phenomenon and that a full account must
synthesize the insights of each.
The article begins with discussion of the theory that the placebo
effect is a myth, for if this is correct then any further discussion is
unnecessary. However, although skeptics have raised various im-
portant issues regarding admissible evidence for the placebo effect,
the best evidence favors the view that the placebo effect is a
genuine phenomenon. After this conclusion is established, the next
section deals with two of the main approaches to the placebo
effect, expectancy theory and classical conditioning. The relation-
ship of these approaches is often misconstrued. Typically, they are
pitted against one another, but in fact they are compatible (al-
though note that they are neither two separate but interacting
processes nor two different ways of construing the same phenom-
enon). The subsequent section looks at the issue of how expect-
ancies produce placebo effects. To account for the full range of
expectancy-related placebo effects, it is necessary for one to com-
bine the expectancy approach with several other theoretical ac-
counts, including such theories as that placebo effects are a product
of emotional change (e.g., anxiety reduction), schematic process-
ing, or change in behavior. Finally, the place of biological ap-
proaches in a complete model of the placebo effect is considered.
This inevitably raises the issue of the relationship of subjective to
objective phenomena.
Before going any further, I think it is important to consider some
of the major claims that have been made about the placebo effect.
Any complete account of this phenomenon must be able to explain
(or explain away) these characteristics. (a) An adequate theory
must account for the full range of placebo effects, which includes
not only subjective effects but also objectively measurable phys-
iological effects. (b) The theory should account not only for
desirable placebo effects but also for undesirable effects. Further-
more, it must account for the clinical observation that placebos can
simultaneously produce both desirable and undesirable symptoms.
For example, placebos can improve health but also produce pla-
cebo side effects (Shapiro, Chassan, Morris, & Frick, 1974). (c) In
addition to side effects, placebos mimic other characteristics of the
1 The discussion here is limited to proximal causes of the placebo effect.
For speculative accounts of the ultimate evolutionary origins of the phe-
nomenon, see Humphrey (2002) and Evans (2003).
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Steve
Stewart-Williams, School of Psychology, Massey University, Palmerston
North, New Zealand. E-mail: anonymous1@xtra.co.nz
Health Psychology Copyright 2004 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.
2004, Vol. 23, No. 2, 198–206 0278-6133/04/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0278-6133.23.2.198
198
active agents they are believed to be. For instance, placebos mimic
the dose–response relationship of active agents (e.g., two placebo
pills work better than one, and a large capsule better than a smaller
one; Buckalew & Ross, 1981; de Craen et al., 1999). (d) Placebo
injections produce stronger effects than do placebo capsules and
pills (de Craen et al., 1999; Kaptchuk, Goldman, Stone, & Stason,
2000). (e) Stronger placebo effects are found with self-report than
with objective measures (Hro´bjartsson & Gøtzsche, 2001; Nash &
Zimring, 1969). (f) Active placebos (substances or procedures
designed to treat one condition but used as placebos for another)
appear to amplify the magnitude of placebo effects, producing
stronger effects than inactive placebos (Thomson, 1982). (g) Pla-
cebo effects are found both in healthy and in ill people. Indeed,
some of the best-established placebo effects have involved healthy
participants in nonclinical, experimental settings. These include
studies using placebo analgesics, placebo stimulants and tranquil-
izers, and placebo alcohol (Kirsch, 1997). (h) Placebo effects,
including placebo analgesia, may be global or localized. In one
study (Montgomery & Kirsch, 1996), a placebo anesthetic was
applied to one index finger of each participant, and then the same
level of pain stimulation was applied to both index fingers. Placebo
analgesia was localized to the finger on which the placebo had
been applied. At least one research group has replicated this result
(Benedetti, Arduino, & Amanzio, 1999).
Explaining Away the Placebo Effect: The Placebo
as a Myth
Before investigating any theories of the placebo effect, one must
first address the possibility that there are no placebo effects and
that the findings presented above are a product of methodological
or interpretational errors. A number of arguments have aimed to
establish this conclusion. One of the strongest begins with the
observation that people often fail to distinguish between placebo
effects and placebo responses. A placebo response is any change
that occurs after the administration of a placebo (Kirsch & Sa-
pirstein, 1999). This change may be due to many factors, including
natural fluctuations in symptoms, spontaneous remission, or re-
gression to the mean (McDonald, Mazzuca, & McCabe, 1983). A
placebo effect is the portion of the placebo response, if any, that is
attributable to the placebo; that is, it would not have occurred if the
placebo had not been administered. The difficulty that arises when
placebo responses are not distinguished from placebo effects is
that genuine changes in the placebo group may be mistakenly
attributed to the administration of a placebo. Claims of placebo
efficacy are commonly based on clinical trials in which, following
the administration of the placebo, an improvement is shown in the
placebo control group. However, few clinical trials include a
no-placebo control group, and unless the change in the placebo
group can be compared with the change in a no-placebo control
group, it is impossible to determine what proportion of the placebo
response is a genuine placebo effect. In fact, critics point out that
there may be no placebo effect at all. Later, I consider a meta-
analysis of clinical trials that did use appropriate control conditions
and supposedly confirmed this speculation.
So, one danger is that genuine changes will be misattributed to
the placebo. A second danger is that recipients and researchers will
conclude that a genuine change has occurred when it has not
(Kirsch, 1997). Placebo effects are generally measured with self-
report methods. This opens the door to a number of biases. First,
people may not describe their own symptoms accurately or hon-
estly. They may, for instance, exaggerate symptoms before treat-
ment and minimize them afterward (Frank & Frank, 1991). In
addition to misrepresentation, self-report data may be distorted by
perceptual biases. In other words, there may be no change in the
target variable, but the placebo recipient or other observers may
falsely perceive that such a change has occurred.2 The following
example illustrates this point: If a prescribing physician or exper-
imenter tells recipients to expect side effects, the recipients may
notice symptoms that they would not have noticed otherwise but
that would have occurred anyway (Ross & Olson, 1981). Percep-
tual biases may not only affect placebo recipients. False placebo
effects may also be a product of observer bias. If placebo research
is not conducted with double-blind research methodologies, there
is the possibility that experimenters will “find” evidence of ex-
pected placebo effects even when such evidence is not really there.
Finally, in addition to the possibility that taking a placebo creates
perceptual bias, it may create a response bias (Morris & O’Neal,
1974). For example, a placebo analgesic may not alter the recip-
ient’s pain experience but just raise the criterion for labeling this
experience painful (Clark, 1969).
The skeptics’ arguments are persuasive and their criticisms
pertinent. Between them, they can account for many of the alleged
effects of placebos, including reports of subjective and objective
effects and both desirable and undesirable effects. Some of the
factors outlined, such as natural fluctuations and regression to the
mean, are applicable only to clinical populations and to positive,
health-related placebo effects and would not explain findings such
as the dose–response relationship. However, other factors, such as
the perceptual bias and response bias hypotheses, would also
account for supposed placebo effects in healthy people. Further-
more, the perceptual bias hypothesis can account for apparent
dose–response relationships and for simultaneous desirable and
undesirable effects.
As plausible as the skeptics’ arguments appear, the issue can of
course be settled only by empirical research. Consider first the
argument that apparent placebo effects are really due to factors
such as spontaneous remission but that this has been overlooked
because of the lack of no-placebo control groups in most clinical
research. An influential recent meta-analysis (Hro´bjartsson &
Gøtzsche, 2001) attempted to address this issue. The researchers
were able to locate 114 placebo-controlled clinical trials that also
included no-treatment control groups. The studies were analyzed
in terms of their outcome measures: continuous (e.g., gradations of
fever) versus binary (e.g., dead or alive) data and subjective
(self-report) versus objective data. The results of their meta-
analysis came as a shock to many in the field. No statistically
significant effects of placebos were found for either the binary or
the objective data. The only significant placebo effects were found
for studies using continuous, subjective data.
Hro´bjartsson and Gøtzsche’s (2001) meta-analysis was taken by
many as a demonstration that the placebo effect is a myth. In fact,
the results suggest at best that it is weaker than some have claimed
2 It is not suggested that changes in the perception of an illness or
symptom are unimportant or have no clinical relevance but only that they
are not placebo effects.
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and that it occurs in a narrower range of clinical conditions and
circumstances. Even this conclusion may be unjustified, however,
as the study had a number of difficulties that limit the generality of
the conclusions that can be drawn from it (Ader, 2001; Brody &
Weismantel, 2001; Greene et al., 2001; Kirsch & Scoboria, 2001).
Most important, although the researchers were able to do a sepa-
rate analysis for trials involving pain (and they found a significant
effect), their other conclusions were based on combining studies
involving a wide range of maladies. As a result, genuine placebo
effects in a subset of these conditions may have been undetectable
because they were pooled together with conditions in which there
are no placebo effects. Also, as the authors themselves hinted, the
placebo protocols and outcome measures were not sufficiently
similar for a meaningful meta-analysis (Brody & Weismantel,
2001). In addition to these methodological limitations, the study
was based solely on clinical data, and its findings need to be
weighed against the well-controlled experimental research that
consistently demonstrates placebo effects in humans and other
animals (for reviews, see Benedetti & Amanzio, 1997; Kirsch,
1997).
Much of this experimental research also escapes the second
category of problems, those associated with the use of self-report
data. In many cases, subjective reports have been corroborated by
objective measurements. For instance, changes in reported pain
levels have been corroborated by indirect evidence suggesting that
placebo analgesics sometimes increase the rate of activation of
endorphin systems and other pain systems in the brain (Amanzio &
Benedetti, 1999; Benedetti & Amanzio, 1997; Levine, Gordon, &
Fields, 1978; see Biological Approaches section). Similarly,
changes in reported arousal have been corroborated by objective
measurements of physiological parameters such as blood pressure
and heart rate (Frankenhaeuser, Jarpe, Svan, & Wrangsjo, 1963;
Kirsch & Weixel, 1988). Further support for the view that apparent
placebo effects are not due merely to self-report biases comes from
the fact that placebo effects have been found in nonhuman animals,
and research on these animals is of course not based on self-report
data. The findings in question include a placebo response to
amphetamines (Herrnstein, 1962) and placebo-induced immuno-
suppression (Ader & Cohen, 1975, 1982, 1991).
Overall, the evidence favors the view that the placebo effect is
a genuine phenomenon and not merely a product of misattribution
or misperception. Nonetheless, the criticisms made of the current
placebo literature lead to several conclusions about what consti-
tutes admissible evidence for the placebo effect. First, there must
be a control group or no-treatment group or some other method-
ology that makes it possible to determine whether any changes are
due to the administration of the placebo. Second, whenever pos-
sible, self-report measures should be accompanied by objective
measurements such as physiological recordings, as objective mea-
surements avoid the problem of demand characteristics, perceptual
biases, and response biases. Finally, research into the placebo
effect should be conducted with double-blind methodology to
avoid the possibility of experimenter bias.
Expectancy and Conditioning
Accepting that placebos sometimes produce placebo effects,
how can researchers account for this fact? The two main functional
approaches to the placebo effect are expectancy theory and clas-
sical conditioning. These approaches provide a foundation for
explanations of the placebo effect. As discussed below, however,
the relationship between them is often misunderstood. (A detailed
discussion of this issue can be found in Stewart-Williams & Podd,
2004.)
Expectancy Theory
Expectancy theory has become one of the most popular theories
of the placebo effect. In this account, a hypothetical expectancy
(e.g., “If I take drug X, I will experience effect Y ”) sets the stage
for a placebo effect. Taking a placebo then produces a categorical
expectancy (e.g., “I will experience effect Y”), and it is this belief
that produces the placebo effect. People may acquire hypothetical
expectancies in a number of ways. One is through direct personal
experience. Other factors shaping expectancies include verbal in-
formation (suggestion), observational learning, and common fac-
tors in therapy (e.g., the quality of a therapeutic relationship, the
normalization of symptoms, provider attention and care, and re-
ceiving a diagnosis). Personal experience appears to be more
effective in shaping expectancies and placebo effects than manip-
ulations such as verbal suggestion (Montgomery & Kirsch, 1997).
There is good experimental support for the expectancy account.
For instance, it has been shown that expectancies predict placebo
analgesia (Amanzio & Benedetti, 1999; Montgomery & Kirsch,
1997) and placebo-induced physiological arousal (Kirsch &
Weixel, 1988). Expectancy theory also has a number of theoretical
advantages. If the expectation of an effect helps to bring about that
effect, then the theory can account for any effects for which a
person can develop an expectation. Consequently, the theory can
account for simultaneous positive and negative effects, placebo
effects in healthy people, and localized placebo effects (Montgom-
ery & Kirsch, 1996). Expectancy theory also offers an explanation
for the greater efficacy of active placebos: The side effects pro-
duced by active placebos enhance people’s expectancies and con-
sequently enhance the placebo effect.
Despite these advantages, however, expectancy theory has a
number of shortcomings. First, although expectancies are often
associated with placebo effect magnitude (de Jong, van Baast,
Arntz, & Merkelbach, 1996; Montgomery & Kirsch, 1997; Nash &
Zimring, 1969; Price et al., 1999), this correlation is not always
found (Spanos et al., 1993; Spanos, Perlini, & Robertson, 1989).
Furthermore, cognitions other than expectancies may contribute to
placebo effects. For instance, research suggests that people who
experience placebo analgesia engage in more cognitive coping and
less catastrophizing than nonresponders (Spanos et al., 1989). As
well as contributing to genuine placebo effects, people’s expecta-
tions may also increase the likelihood that they will perceive an
effect when none has occurred. Finally, there is some ambiguity in
the expectancy construct. Some maintain that expectancies should
be defined as consciously accessible mental entities (Kirsch, Lynn,
Vigorito, & Miller, in press), but others suggest that we should also
allow unconscious expectancies (Hahn, 1997). There are a number
of difficulties with the latter position. Expectancies are measured
by self-report, which seems to imply the view that they are
available to conscious scrutiny. If expectancies can be uncon-
scious, then this is not what the expectancy research is measuring.
Furthermore, the idea of unconscious expectancies is scientifically
suspect, as it seems to make expectancy theory immune to falsi-
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fication. Given these considerations, it is best assumed that ex-
pectancies are consciously accessible mental items. (For further
discussion, see Stewart-Williams & Podd, 2004.)
Classical Conditioning
Another important approach to the placebo effect is based on
classical conditioning research. According to traditional descrip-
tions, classical (or Pavlovian) conditioning occurs when an organ-
ism is exposed to the repeated pairing of an unconditioned stim-
ulus (US) and a conditioned stimulus (CS). The US is a stimulus
that elicits an unlearned or unconditioned response (UR). Initially,
the CS has no such effects. After sufficient CS–US pairing trials,
however, the CS presented in the absence of the US elicits a
response similar or related to the UR. This is known as a condi-
tioned response (CR; Pavlov, 1927). Modern accounts of classical
conditioning stress the information value of the CS, in terms of
predicting the subsequent occurrence of the US (Kamin, 1968,
1969; Rescorla, 1968, 1988; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). Condi-
tioned learning does not depend only on the association of events.
It generally occurs when there is a CS–US contingency, that is,
when the CS is a reliable signal that the US will occur in the future
(Wasserman & Miller, 1997). As a result of exposure to this
contingency, subsequent exposure to the CS elicits a representation
of the US (Domjan, 1993). The CR is a simple response to this
representation, the evolutionary function of which is to prepare the
organism for the upcoming presentation of the US (Siegel, 1984,
1989).
The classical conditioning account of the placebo effect has
typically been framed in terms of the earlier model of conditioning.
In this model, the active ingredient in a treatment is the US, and its
pharmacological effects the UR. During a course of therapy, the
active ingredient is paired with various stimuli, such as syringes,
pill casings, or even the entire therapeutic setting. As a result of
this pairing, these stimuli acquire the capacity to elicit a response
similar to that produced by the active ingredients (Wickram-
asekera, 1985). In this framework, a placebo is a CS, and a placebo
effect is a CR. Although this formulation is acceptable as far as it
goes, the traditional account of classical conditioning on which it
is based is outdated (Rescorla, 1988). In a more modern account,
it might be added that conditioned placebo effects occur when an
individual learns that certain stimuli reliably and uniquely predict
the presentation of an active ingredient. The placebo effect is a
response to this information.
The classical conditioning framework furnishes a number of
testable predictions and suggests ways to maximize placebo ef-
fects. For example, on the basis of classical conditioning research,
it would be predicted that the number of pairings of the CS and the
US will determine the magnitude of the placebo effect and that
therapists who routinely use active ingredients or powerful drugs
will get stronger placebo effects than those who routinely use inert
ingredients or weaker drugs (Wickramasekera, 1985). A further
prediction is that placebo effects established through continuous
reinforcement schedules will typically extinguish more rapidly
than those established on intermittent schedules of reinforcement
(Ader, 1997). Finally, Ader (1985) has suggested that an intermit-
tent schedule (e.g., active drug 70% of the time, placebo 30% of
the time) may be just as effective as a schedule of continuous
reinforcement (i.e., active drug 100% of the time).
Conditioned learning may occur for any effects that an active
agent can generate. Consequently, the classical conditioning
framework can be applied to placebo effects in subjective or
objective dimensions; desirable effects, undesirable effects, or the
simultaneous occurrence of both; global or localized effects; and
effects in both healthy and sick people. A stronger US produces a
stronger CR, which fits with the fact that stronger effects are
produced by placebo injections than by placebo pills and capsules.
Similarly, a stronger CS produces a stronger CR, accounting for
the dose–response relationship.
Relationship of Conditioning to Expectancy
On the one hand, classical conditioning is often pitted against
expectancy theory as an explanation for the placebo effect, perhaps
because it is assumed that conditioning is by definition a noncog-
nitive form of learning. On the other hand, some theorists claim
that the two approaches are compatible. This would be the case, for
instance, if they were two ways of construing the same phenom-
enon (e.g., a physiological and a psychological perspective, or a
third-person and a first-person perspective) or two distinct but
interacting processes (in which case some placebo effects might be
due to conditioning, some to expectancy, and some to a combina-
tion of the two). Both these approaches must be rejected, for both
are based on a faulty initial assumption: that the two approaches
are answers to the same question. However, unlike the expectancy
approach, classical conditioning is not a theory. This is clear when
it is considered that there are various different theories that aim to
account for classically conditioned phenomena. Furthermore,
whereas expectancy theory focuses on a psychological variable,
classical conditioning is defined solely in terms of a certain rela-
tionship between stimulus inputs and subsequent outputs. More
precisely, it occurs when exposure to a contingency between a
CS and a US results in a change in the organism’s behavior,
physiology, or psychological state. This leaves open the question
of the mediation of classically conditioned effects, that is, the
mediation of the conditioned CS–CR link (Stewart-Williams &
Podd, 2004).3
Some placebo effects fit the classical conditioning mold: Expo-
sure to a CS–US contingency (input) shapes a placebo effect to the
CS (output). In some cases, the learning underlying conditioned
placebo effects appears to be nonconscious, in line with the com-
mon perception of conditioning. One research group, for instance,
demonstrated that following conditioning with opioids, a placebo
in the guise of an opioid drug could evoke respiratory depression
for which the recipient had no expectation (Benedetti et al., 1998;
3 It might be argued that conditioning is by definition a nonconscious
learning mechanism. However, common usage of the term is inconsistent
with this view: Regardless of their position on the issue, it makes sense to
most people to ask whether classical conditioning is mediated by conscious
cognition. If conditioning were by definition a nonconscious process, this
question would make no more sense than asking whether bachelors are
married or unmarried.
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Benedetti, Amanzio, Baldi, Casadio, & Maggi, 1999).4 In other
cases, however, placebo effects shaped by conditioning procedures
are mediated by conscious expectancies. For example, in a series
of experiments, Voudouris, Peck, and Coleman (1985, 1989, 1990)
showed that a conditioning manipulation could enhance the pla-
cebo analgesic response to an inert cream. Later investigation
suggested that this effect was mediated entirely by the change the
manipulation produced in the participants’ expectancies concern-
ing the cream (Montgomery & Kirsch, 1997). This is not to deny
that it was an instance of classical conditioning but rather to
specify the mechanism of this conditioned placebo effect.
So, some placebo effects are examples of classical conditioning,
and of these some are mediated by expectancies whereas others are
not cognitively mediated. In addition, not all expectancy-mediated
placebo effects are examples of classical conditioning. Some are
shaped by verbal information rather than a CS–US contingency
and therefore do not fit the input–output pattern that defines
classical conditioning. Note that this is not to argue that some
placebo effects are due to expectancy, others to conditioning, and
others still to a combination of both. That would be to suppose that
classical conditioning is a specific form of learning, inevitably
distinct from processes of expectancy. This is not the case, how-
ever. As noted, conditioning is defined solely in terms of a par-
ticular relationship between stimulus inputs and behavioral, phys-
iological, or psychological outputs, and in some cases expectancy
learning mediates this relationship. In short, expectancy mediates
some but not all placebo effects, and classical conditioning pro-
cedures are one of the various sources of learning that can lead to
placebo effects.
How Do Expectancies Produce Placebo Effects?
Although not all placebo effects are mediated by conscious
expectancies, expectancies appear to play a pivotal role in most
placebo effects in humans. A key task facing expectancy theorists
is to explain how expectancies can result in placebo effects. One
suggestion comes from Kirsch’s (1997) response expectancy the-
ory, according to which “some of the effects of expectancy may be
direct, rather than mediated” (p. 175). In clearing the ground for
this view, Kirsch (1997) pointed out that some connections among
variables must be unmediated, or else there would be an infinite
regress of intervening variables. As such, there is no difficulty in
the notion that expectations for subjective states can lead directly
to those states. Although it is not clear that all subjective effects
can be explained in this way, in some cases Kirsch’s (1997)
hypothesis has an intuitive plausibility. For instance, the expecta-
tion of anxiety is likely to be anxiety provoking, and the expecta-
tion of depression is likely to be depressing (Kirsch, 1985, 1997).
As discussed later, however, there are other ways to explain
subjective placebo effects.
In addition to subjective effects, Kirsch (1985) noted that ex-
pectancy theory can account for some objectively measurable
effects of placebos without invoking mediating variables. The
effects in question are autonomic responses directly connected
with subjective states. These include blood pressure and heart rate,
which are associated with subjective experiences of arousal and
relaxation. Kirsch (1997) suggested that expectancy theory has
more trouble accounting for other physiological effects, effects
that are not intimately and immediately linked with subjective
states. If expectancies do produce such effects, it may be necessary
to invoke mediating variables. A number of other cognitive theo-
ries of the placebo effect may be relevant in this connection.
Although none has made the headway that expectancy theory has,
there is reason to suppose that each may contribute to an
expectancy-based model of the placebo effect. In the following
sections, roles are found for emotional change, schematic process-
ing, and behavior change in mediating between expectancies and
subsequent placebo effects.
Emotional Change Theory
First, let us consider the theory that placebo effects are a product
of emotional change. This is most commonly discussed in terms of
anxiety reduction. The idea is this: When people take placebos that
they think will lead to the amelioration of unpleasant symptoms or
that enhance their sense of mastery and control over a disease, this
is likely to promote a reduction in anxiety and stress, which in turn
may lead to improvements in psychological and physical health
(Brody & Brody, 2000; Lick & Bootzin, 1975; Lundh, 1987).
Reduced levels of depression and demoralization may provide a
further contribution (Frank & Frank, 1991). Emotional change
theory is not limited to the explanation of desirable effects of
placebos. If a placebo can have desirable effects by making one
less anxious or depressed, it can presumably also have undesirable
effects by making one more anxious or depressed.
Changes in emotional state may exert their influence via a
number of channels. First, such changes can influence other sub-
jective variables. For example, anxiety can exacerbate pain, and
consequently a reduction in anxiety would be expected to reduce
pain (Benedetti & Amanzio, 1997; Staats, Hekmat, & Staat, 1998).
Second, emotional change theory is associated with a plausible
mechanism through which emotional states may influence physical
health and thereby account for some objectively measurable pla-
cebo effects. The growing field of psychoneuroimmunology in-
vestigates how mental states influence the immune system (Maier,
Watkins, & Fleshner, 1994). Chronic anxiety, stress, and depres-
sion impair immune system function (Lundh, 2000). Conse-
quently, lessening these emotional states may enhance the healing
process.5 Various other factors may also contribute to placebo-
induced improvements in physical health. For instance, decreased
anxiety may lead to improved sleep patterns, or decreased depres-
sion to greater levels of activity; both of these factors may con-
tribute to improved health.
4 It was noted earlier that most modern classical conditioning theorists
view conditioning as a process in which the CS acquires the capacity to
elicit a mental representation of the US. This representation is sometimes
explicitly identified as an expectation. In this view, all conditioning would
be mediated by expectancy. As noted, however, there are strong reasons to
restrict the definition of expectancies to consciously accessible mental
states. Under this definition, classical conditioning is sometimes but not
always mediated by expectancies.
5 Sometimes the improved healing rates found in people taking placebos
may be due to a release from negative placebo effects. In such cases, rather
than contributing a new, positive influence to health, placebos may simply
allow the natural healing process to take place uninhibited by negative
placebo effects. This would account only for placebo effects in people with
health problems.
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Although emotional change theory can account for desirable
effects and undesirable effects, it cannot easily account for the
simultaneous occurrence of both (Kirsch, 1985). This is because,
according to this account, desirable and undesirable placebo ef-
fects are produced by opposite causes (e.g., high vs. low anxiety),
which logic dictates cannot occur simultaneously. Another short-
coming is that none of the emotional changes suggested can
account for placebo effects in normal, healthy individuals (Kirsch,
1997). Furthermore, because emotional change is a global mech-
anism, it cannot account for localized placebo effects, such as the
localized placebo analgesia demonstrated by Montgomery and
Kirsch (1996) and Benedetti, Arduino, and Amanzio (1999). Note,
though, that even if emotional change cannot account for all
placebo effects, there is research to suggest that it does play a role
in some (see de Jong et al., 1996).
It may be possible to incorporate emotional change into an
expectancy-based account of the placebo effect. The relevant emo-
tional changes are presumably not direct responses to a placebo;
instead, they may be responses to placebo-induced expectancies.
For instance, the expectation that one will recover from an illness
is likely to reduce anxiety about the illness. This emotional change
may sometimes mediate the relationship between expectancies and
placebo effects. As yet, this hypothesis has not been subjected to
direct empirical test. Such a test would be a valuable contribution
to the placebo literature.
Perceptual Change: The Schematic Processing Approach
Another suggestion concerning the etiology of the placebo ef-
fect is that it is a product of selective processing (Jensen & Karoly,
1985; Pennebaker & Skelton, 1981). This approach can be usefully
framed in the language of schema theory. Taking a placebo acti-
vates a cognitive schema of the expected effects. Once this schema
has been activated, people are more likely to (a) notice and recall
any information or experience consistent with that schema, (b)
interpret ambiguous information in a manner consistent with the
schema, and (c) overlook mildly inconsistent information or dis-
miss it as invalid (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Pennebaker & Lightner,
1980; Pennebaker & Skelton, 1981). Expecting relief from an
illness, for example, people might notice small positive changes
they would otherwise have overlooked and overlook small nega-
tive changes they would otherwise have noticed (Peck & Coleman,
1991).
In themselves, these changes in perception would not constitute
placebo effects; they might simply lead a person to infer that an
effect has occurred when it has not. For example, chronic pain
patients taking placebo analgesics might “remember” having ex-
perienced less pain than they did prior to the placebo but actually
have experienced as much as ever. This is the main problem with
the original formulation of the selective processing approach.
However, schematic processing may indirectly shape genuine sub-
jective placebo effects. Various lines of research suggest that
attending to internal experiences such as sensations and emotions
can amplify these experiences (Franzoi, 1996). By attending to
pain, for instance, a person might actually experience more pain.
Similarly, in hypochondriasis, the conviction that one has a par-
ticular disease appears to amplify the experience of any supposed
symptoms (Avia, 1999; Barsky, 1992). This suggests a route by
which schema-mediated changes in perception and attention could
lead to genuine placebo effects, if only in subjective experience.
Simply stated, placebos activate schemas, schemas direct attention,
and self-directed attention intensifies that to which we attend.
The above examples of attentional amplification may create the
impression that the proposed mechanism is applicable only to
undesirable effects, such as the intensification of pain or undesir-
able somatic symptoms. However, the mechanism would apply to
any subjective state for which a person has a schema, including
desirable states such as positive mood. It may even account for
placebo effects that involve the amelioration of a state, such as the
reduction of pain. The reception of a placebo analgesic, for in-
stance, might activate a schema of a pain-free state. The recipient’s
attention would then be diverted from any nonsevere pain and
refocused on sensations that are indicative for the recipient of a
pain-free state. As a result, the latter sensations may increase in
intensity whereas the former are eclipsed. At this stage, there is
little research pertaining to the possible role of schematic process-
ing and attention in the placebo effect. If these variables are
involved, however, they may help to explain how expectancies can
bring about the expected subjective effects: The formation of a
categorical expectancy can be interpreted as the activation of a
schema of the expected effects of the placebo, and the effects of
the expectancy may be a product of its influence on attention and
the subsequent effects of attention on subjective state.
Behavioral Change
In addition to changes in perception and emotional state, place-
bos may promote changes in behavior, and these may in turn
contribute to the production of placebo effects (Turner, Deyo,
Loeser, Von Korff, & Fordyce, 1994). For instance, when people
believe they are recovering from an illness, they are likely to feel
happier and socialize more. This behavior may reduce loneliness
and enhance social support, which could lead to improved immune
system function and thus improved health. The behavior of other
individuals in the patient’s environment may also be relevant. If
others believe a positive change in health status has occurred, they
may act toward patients in ways that encourage them to be more
active as opposed to acting in ways that may reinforce the sick
role. Notice that these speculations apply only to health-related
placebo effects, and as a result that this approach is somewhat
limited in its explanatory power. Nonetheless, behavioral change
may shed some light on the mechanisms through which expectan-
cies bring about this subset of placebo effects. As such, it may be
possible to bring behavioral change under the umbrella of an
expectancy account. The changes in behavior that result in health-
related placebo effects might follow from altered expectancies
(e.g., the expectation of improved health) or from expectancy-
induced changes in emotional state. In short, behavioral change
may be one among several variables that mediates the connection
between expectancies and placebo effects and takes its place
alongside emotional change and schematic processing.
Biological Approaches
The major focus of the present article is the psychological
factors involved in the placebo effect, not their biological corre-
lates. Nevertheless, the correlates of a number of placebo effects
have been uncovered, and it is important to put these into the
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context of the present discussion. By far the most famous discov-
ery related to the neurobiology of the placebo effect concerns the
opioid antagonist naloxone, which, as noted earlier, sometimes
blocks placebo analgesia (Benedetti & Amanzio, 1997; Fields &
Levine, 1984; Levine et al., 1978). Similarly, blocking cholecys-
tokinin, a neuropeptide that has antiopioid effects, leads to height-
ened placebo analgesia (Benedetti & Amanzio, 1997). The impli-
cation of these findings is that endogenous opioids (endorphins)
are involved in some instances of placebo analgesia.6
The endorphin discovery is often presented as a theory of the
placebo effect, in competition with psychological explanations
such as expectancy theory. Kirsch (1985) argued, however, that
rather than being another theory of the placebo effect, endorphin
release is better construed as an example of a placebo effect, one
set in motion by such factors as expectancies. Another reason to be
wary of the idea that endorphin release is a theory of the placebo
effect comes from consideration of the relationship of mind to
brain. Although there are a variety of possible solutions to this
age-old philosophical question, the dominant view among modern
philosophers is that mind and brain activity are somehow one and
the same thing (Dennett, 1991). From this perspective, it might be
argued that endorphin release is not the cause of placebo analgesia;
instead, endorphin activity is placebo analgesia, viewed from a
biological rather than a psychological perspective. This would
imply that the biological perspective is not an alternative theoret-
ical account competing with psychological accounts of the placebo
effect. It is an analysis of the same phenomenon from a different
perspective.
Putting Together the Pieces
The preceding discussion has touched on some of the connec-
tions and consistencies among the different approaches to the
placebo effect. Figure 1 shows how these pieces might fit together.
On the left of the figure are some of the main factors thought to be
involved in the shaping of placebo effects. On the right are three
placebo outcomes: subjective placebo effects, objectively measur-
able placebo effects, and false placebo effects.7 The figure depicts
various possible paths from shaping factors to placebo outcomes.
First, conditioning procedures may result in noncognitive learning
or in the formation of consciously accessible expectancies. (In
other words, classically conditioned placebo effects may or may
not be mediated by conscious expectancies.) In contrast, variables
6 Other recent findings related to the neurobiology of the placebo effect
include the discovery that the placebo effect in Parkinson’s disease is
mediated by an increased level of endogenous dopamine in the striatum (de
la Fuente-Fernandez & Stoessl, 2002) and that dopamine mediates placebo-
induced enhancement of motor performance (Benedetti, 2002).
7 If it is accepted that mind is equivalent to brain activity, the distinction
between subjective and objective effects may seem somewhat problematic
and arbitrary. After all, if subjective experiences are isomorphic with
patterns of activity in the brain, then in principle direct objective measure-
ments could be made of subjective experiences. In practice, though, the
distinction is useful most of the time. The subjective category embraces all
conscious bodily activity (i.e., some brain activity), whereas the objective
category usually refers to nonconscious bodily activity outside the brain
(e.g., heart beat, which although we may be conscious of it, is not itself a
conscious experience). The distinction breaks down only when objective
measurements are made of conscious bodily activity (e.g., through brain
imaging), at which time we must recognize that the terms subjective and
objective do not label two distinct ontological kinds but rather two different
perspectives on the same thing. The objective perspective consists of brain
activity viewed from the perspective of an outside observer, whereas the
subjective perspective consists of brain activity viewed from the perspec-
tive of the acting brain itself.
Figure 1. An integrative model of the placebo effect.
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such as verbal persuasion, observational learning, and common
factors in therapy presumably shape only conscious expectancies.
Other variables, such as regression to the mean, natural fluctua-
tions in an illness, spontaneous remission, and perceptual biases,
may result in false placebo effects.
Noncognitive learning may result in both subjective and objec-
tively measurable placebo effects. In contrast, expectancies may
directly produce subjective placebo effects (Kirsch, 1997), or the
effects of expectancies may be mediated by emotional change,
behavioral change, or schematic processing. Like noncognitive
learning, behavioral change may lead to both subjective and ob-
jective placebo effects. Emotional change may lead directly to
(other) subjective effects, and may indirectly result in objective
placebo effects, via its influence on the functioning of the immune
system. Schematic processing may lead directly to false placebo
effects and may indirectly result in genuine subjective placebo
effects through the amplification of subjective states that occurs
when people focus their attention on these states. Figure 1 also
suggests that false placebo effects may influence the recipient’s
expectancies about placebos, which in turn may increase the like-
lihood of genuine placebo effects in the future.
This model of the placebo effect provides a tidy framework for
locating research efforts and a reminder that these approaches are
not necessarily in competition. The placebo effect is a complex
phenomenon and is likely to involve the interplay of a variety of
factors. An understanding of these factors may be of assistance to
health professionals. It may, for example, enable them to maximize
therapeutic benefits without the use of stronger drugs or larger
doses. However, some of the mechanisms involved in the placebo
effect may be better accessed by means other than the use of
placebos. For instance, if the reduction of anxiety and depression
enhances physical health, psychotherapy may be superior to the
use of placebos in producing this emotional change. Nonetheless,
as this very example shows, research into the mechanisms under-
lying the placebo effect may be extremely valuable, as it can be
expected to yield knowledge that will prove useful beyond the
context of placebo use.
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